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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF REINSTATEMENT
AS A PUBLIC POLICY REMEDY:
THE KOHLER CASE
JOHN E. DROTNING and DAVID B. LIPSKY
IN 1952, nearly twenty years after theAmerican Federation of Labor tried
to organize the Kohler Company, the
United Automobile Workers won bar-
gaining rights.^ But its success was
ephemeral. Victory at the polls turned to
defeat at the bargaining table in 1954
This article is concerned with two aspects of
the NLRB reinstatement remedy as applied in
the famous Kohler case: (1) how effective the
remedy was. particularly in terms of the number
of employees who returned to Knhler under its
protection, and (2) what factors, in order of sig-
nificance, affected a worker's dcdsion to return.
The authors find the remedy was effective, since
about 40 percent of those workers who received
reinstatement offers accepted them. Regres.sion
and discriminant analyses of the variables affect-
ing the decision to return confirm the thinking
of labor market economists that the most dis-
advantaged worker (lower paid, older, less edu-
cated, less skilled, married, with children and
with a notiworking wife) was most likely to
return to a Kohler job. Recommendations are
offered for improving the efficacy of the rein-
statement remedy, with emphasis on adding a
penalty cost to its back-pay feature.
John E. Drotning is as.sociate professor of
industrial relations and organization. State Uni-
versity of New York at Buffalo. David B.
Lipsky is assistant professor of industrial re-
lations. State University of New York at Buf-
falo, The authors express appreciation to Gordon
Teeter and Brad Powell of Purdue University
and Sam Giancarlo, State University of New York
at Buffalo, for their assistance and to Harry
Brickman. National Labor Relations Board, for
his encouragement of the study. They also
acknowledge a debt of gratitude to the Comput-
ing Center and the Industrial Relations Seminar
at Buffalo.—EDITOR
when the auto workers struck Kohler in.
a last-ditch efFort to force management
to bargain in good faith. So began the
longest industrial dispute in modem
times.2
It was not until August 1960, over six
years after the strike began, that the
National Labor Relations Board found
Kohler guilty of bad-faith bargaining.
The Board ordered Kohler to bargain in
good faith with the employees and to
reinstate workers who applied for their
old jobs.3 This raises a significant ques-
tion. How effective is the present public
fHjlicy remedy, especially in extended un-
fair labor practice strikes? This question
is usually argued on the basis of logical
deduction atid legal precedent. In this
article, the usual method of analysis is
combined with an empirical investiga-
tion of the reinstatement remedy as it
operated in the Kohler case. The effec-
tiveness of the reinstatement remedy
must be judged, in part, on its oper-
ational impact. How many workers were
reinstated to their jobs? What factors
were related to their decision to return
to Kohler? The authors do not argue that
^Walter H. Uphoff. Kohler on Strike (Boston,
Mass.: Beacon Press, 1966).
'Jack Barbash, "Ideology and the Kohler
Strike." Wisconsin Law Review, Spring 1967, p.
468.
'Kohler Company 128 NLRB 1062 (1960).
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the percentage of workers accepting rein-
statement, or their characteristics, are the
only criteria—or even the best criteria—
in judging the effectiveness of reinstate-
ment. They do argue that an empirical
analysis of the impact of a public policy
remedy employed with more traditional
forms of analyses can best lead to an in-
formed judgment on the question of
effectiveness.
Before turning to an analysis of the
data in the Kohler case, it is necessary to
discuss the mechanics of the NLRB's re-
instatement remedy, with and without
the back-pay feature. Subsequent sections
of the article discuss the source and na-
ture of the data available, the more
general dimensions of Kohler's court-
ordered offer and the workers' response,
the general hypothesis underlying our
empirical analysis, followed by the analy-
sis itself—a statistical examination of the
determinants of the strikers' response to
reinstatement. Reinstatement is analyzed
further in terms of its remedial intent or
objective and a recommendation is made
designed to improve the reinstatement
remedy.
Mechanics of the Reinstatement Remedy
Reinstatement with or without back
pay applies to (1) pro-union workers dis-
charged during union organizing drives
and to (2) strikers protesting their em-
ployers's bad-faith bargaining. The differ-
ences between the two situations are
worth elaborating.
An organizing union usually tries to
identify and use a small group of .strongly
pro-union workers in the unorganized
plant. Once the campaign is on, these
activities are visible to management and
the work force. Some anti-union employ-
ers may fire organizers to intimidate the
work force into voting against union rep-
resentation. Such employers commit an
8(a)(3)* unfair labor practice. Only a
small number of employees have to be
discharged from a plant during an organ-
izing drive for the employer to defeat the
union at the polls.^ These employees can
complain individually or through a
union and usually can get the National
Labor Relations Board to require the
employer to offer them reinstatement.
Whether they accept it or not is another
question. The discharged employee's re-
sponse to the reinstatement offer is likely
to depend on his perception of what his
work life will be like after reinstatement.
Will he be tlie victim of subtle coercion
or will he be accepted as though he had
never struck? Moreover, the character of
work life must depend on whether the
union won or lost bargaining rights. If
the union lost, the reinstated union activ-
ist is not likely to be welcomed back to
his old job by a hostile employer.^
Reinstatement also applies when the
employer retiises to bargain in good faith
witli the union. In such cases, the work-
ers may protest their employer's bad-faith
conduct by striking. In contrast to eco-
nomic strikers, these unfair labor practice
strikers must be taken back if they apply
for unconditional reinstatement. If, liow-
ever, the employer is innocent, unfair
labor practice strikers become economic
strikers and run the commensurate risk
of permanent job loss. The critical point
•Section 8{a)(3) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act prohibits an employer from discriminat-
ing a^inst employees to discourage membership
in a union.
"John E. Droming, "The Union Representa-
tion Election: A Study in Persuasion." Monthly
Labor Revieu', \'ol. 88. No. 8 (August 1065). pp.
938-943.
S^ec Leslie Aspin, "A Study of Reinstatement
Under the National Labor Relations Act" (Ph.D.
dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy. 1966); and Bernard Sanioff, "The Impact of
Taft Hartley Job Discrimination Victories," In-
dustrial Relations. Vol, 4, No. 5 (May 1965), pp.
77-94.
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in such cases is whether the NLRB
regional office issues a complaint.' If it
does, the risk o£ permanent job loss by
unfair labor practice strikers is reduced
significantly since complaints are usually
upheld by the Board and/or courts.
Assume an employer bargains in bad
faith and hi.s employees strike. The strik-
ers may have sufficient economic strength
to force the employer to bargain in good
faith. If so, presumably they will return
to work under a new contract. If they
cannot impose significant costs on their
employer, however, they can (I) continue
to walk the picket line, (2) find other
work, or (3) apply for reinstatement. The
union, of course, can press the unfair
'After tlie Board issues a complaint, the union
may tell the workers to return to work while it
presses the charge. Any employer who docs not
accept the strikers' applications may incur large
back-pay costs.
labor practice diarge regardless of its
members' decisions.^
If the strikers apply for unconditional
reinstatement, the employer can (1) reject
their applications, (2) make an inade-
quate job offer, or (3) make a bona fide
offer. If either (1) or (2) occurs, back pay
begins to accumulate, although the proc-
ess is not as simple as it sounds. Consider
an employer who bargains in bad faith
and is struck by his employees. Each side
faces certain alternatives, and tlie deci-
sions made by the parties set the stage
for further tactical moves. The figure
illustrates the sequential decision making
which can take place.
The employer may capittilate and bar-
gain in good faith at any point during
the strike; capitulation may be dictated
by any number of factors, including the
*This assumes tliat the complaints are "not
reversed" by the Board and/or courts.
Key
ER—Employtr
EE—rimplnym
BGF—Baraiini in Roorf &iih
BBF—Burg ami in bad biih
BP—'Back pty
lo BBF /
EE iirikf and ^ ^ /
NLKB tHu« campliiiii
EK BtIF wi[h
Ubor prnniee itrikcs
r 1
Tbne
Figure
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unavailability of labor and nonlabor sub-
stitutes and the small size of lois inven-
tory. If the strikers shut the employer
down, they have reason to stay out since
they may force him to bargain in good
faith. But ii management hires replace-
ments, the employees cannot impose sig-
nificant costs on him and are forced to
apply for reinstatement and to return to
their old jobs or to seek alternatives.
Moreover, if the employee conditions his
application, the employer need not reply.
If the application is unconditional, how-
ever, and management makes an unac-
ceptable response, back pay begins and
can be collected even if the applicant
never returns to his old job. For example,
if a striker applies for unconditional re-
instatement and the employer rejects
him or oifers him an inadequate job,
the striker may decide not to return to
the old plant before the employer makes
a legitimate resjwnse. In such cases, the
striker may collect back pay from the
time of his application to the point at
which he decided not to go back to his
old job. But one thing is clear, the em-
ployer has no financial liability for the
period t^ - to (where tg represents the
point in time when the employer re-
sponds to the strikers' unconditional ap-
plications for reinstatement—see figure).
The Question of Back Pay
There is a strong sentiment and prece-
dent against holding employers finan-
cially liable to strikers before they un-
conditionally apply for reinstatement.
Originally, the Board ordered reinstate-
ment without considering the possibility
of back pay," but it soon added the back-
pay feattire.io "Yh^ Board, in an early
"Columbian Enameling and Stamping Com-
pany, 1 NLRB 181 (1936); Foster Brothers Manu-
facturinp; Company. Inc.. 1 NLRB 880 (1936).
"Sunshine Hosiery Mills, 1 NLRB 664 (1936);
comment, said, "When employees volun-
tarily go on strike, even if in protest of
unfair labor practices, it has been our
policy not to award tliem back pay dur-
ing tlie strike."^^ It elaborated on this
when it refused to accept an argument
that back pay should be awarded em-
ployees caught in an employer unfair
labor practice strike by saying:
We do not agree to award back pay to such
strikers, no matter how flagrant an employer's
unfair labor practice might be. Snch a policy
would, in our opinion not only encourage
but also place a premium upon resort by
employees to industrial strikes and the inter-
ruption of commerce in order to obtain re-
dress of wrongs, rather than promote recourse
to the orderly administrative process estab-
blisbed by the Act. Inasmuch as it is in-
cumbent upon the Board to formulate and
adopt such remedies as will effecttiate the
policies of the Act. we shall adhere to our
practice of denying backpay to unfair labor
practice strikers under circumstances such
as those in this case."
This statement was reinforced in 1961
when the Board said, "The Act forbids
an employer to discriminate to encourage
or discourage union membership, but it
does not require an employer to reim-
burse employees who choose voluntarily
to be absent from work in the exercise of
their rights under sections 7 and 13 of the
Act."^3 In a later decision, Board mem-
ber John H. Fanning dissented from the
majority finding that the employer owed
back pay to strikers who rejected piece-
meal offers of reinstatement. He said:
While such employees do not lose their re-
instatement rights where, as here, their em-
ployer has unlawfully refused to reinstate
Black Diamond Steamship Corporation, S NLRB
84 (1937), enforced 94 F. 2d 875 (CA. 2).
"American Manufacturing Company, 5 NLRB
443 at 467 (1938).
'=\;'olney Felt Mills. Inc., 70 NLRB 908 at 910
(1946).
'"Northern Virginia Sun Publishing Company,
134 NLRB 1007 (1961).
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their fellow employees, their election to en-
gage in concerted activity is protected from
reprisal, but not financed by the employer.
The Act docs not protect an employee from
loss of wages as a result of a strike even
though the strike was caused by an unfair
labor practice. An employee who prefers
concerted activity to the status of "strike-
breaker" cannot sup at both tables. He can-
not be unavailable for work to put economic
pressure on his employer to rectify a wrong
and at the same time receive full pay for
the job from which he has voluntarily ab-
sented himself."
This was the posture of the Kohler
strikers. They did not apply for rein-
statement until 1960, immediately after
the Board's finding, and so were not
eligible for back pay for the six-year
period between 1954 and 1960.
The Data
The data are contained in two separate
sets of microfilm—more than 9,000 feet
in all. One set contains biographic and
employment information on each Kohler
striker up to 1954. The other set com-
prises employment information from
1960-1965. In some cases, it was pos-
sible to get employment information on
the strikers for the period 1954-1960 as
well. The films contained about 1,800
names. There was fairly complete in-
formation on some of the people, less on
others, and almost none on still others.
But the good far outweighs the bad. It is
a massive amount of information of the
kind which would have been impossible
to get without the help of the National
Labor Relations Board {botli in Wash-
ington, D.C. and Milwaukee). Moreover,
many of the people were interviewed by
the NLRB between 1060 and 1965, and
tliis record is included in the microfilms.
Also important are the affidavits of
some of tlie strikers. The.se give an inside
"Robert S. Abbot Publishing Company, 139
NLRB 1328. fn. 4, p. 1330 (1962).
look at the cost of such a strike to the
workers. No statistics can illustrate what
it must be like for a fifty-five year old
man nearing twenty-five years of service
and a gold watch (wliich was important
to a Kohler worker) to be out of work
for five to eight years.
Since the information on each person
varies, the population size varies de-
pending on the variables imder exami-
nation. The two distinct microfilm
sources, initially coded on two separate
decks of punch cards, were merged into
one deck to facilitate computer analysis.
The Reinstatement Offer and
Strikers' Response
There were about 1,780 employees
named on the UAW's application for
reinstatement in 1960. The company
ofFered reinstatement to all except those
categorized as: (I) strikers discharged for
misbehavior (about 77), (2) strikers who
retired (about 108), and (3) strikers who
had secured a release (about 82). Releases
were short statements signed by em-
ployees stating that they intended to
sever permanently their employment re-
lationship with Kohler. The release was
designed, the authors believe, to distin-
guish between strikers and voluntary
quitters. If the latter lack reinstatement
rights, Kohler could minimize back pay
penalty costs. Releases were occasionally
requested by strikers looking for alterna-
tive employment but more often were re-
qtiired by the worker's prospective
employer. Special Master Judge Edward
M. DuQuaine initially ruled that Kohler
was not required to make an offer of
reinstatement to workers who had retired
or had obtained a release.'' Stibsequent-
"Special Master's Report by Edward M. Du-
Quaine for U. S. District Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit. NLRB v. Koh-
ler Cotnpany. No. 16, 031, Feb. 1. 1965.
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ly, the court's review of tliis ruling
resulted in its reversal.^*
The company made two additional
offers of reinstatement. In September
1964 the Board, in its supplemental de-
ci.sion, foimd that fifty-seven strikers were
improperly discharged for picket-line
activity.iT The company, at or near the
end of the month, made an offer of re-
instatement to the fifty-seven strikers.
Kohler made a third offer in February
1965, following Judge DuQuaine's rul-
ing that the company had been guilty of
contempt. About 111 additional workers
were then offered reinstatement.
In total, the three offers covered about
1,685 workers. Less than 10 percent of
the workers for whom the union made
application failed to receive an offer.
How many strikers accepted reinstate-
ment? According to Walter Uphoff, the
Kohler Company sent letters to about
lAOO .striking employees in 1960 offering
reinstatement. The company "declined
to reveal how many had accepted rein-
statement," but a UAW spokesman esti-
mated the figure to be about l.OOO.i^
We have information on the offer-
acceptance question for only 1,150 work-
ers—about two thirds of the population
of strikers. In this sample, 956 strikers re-
ceived offers and 456 accepted reinstate-
ment (47.6 percent). It is likely that only
a small proportion of the strikers for
whom no infoi-mation was available ac-
cepted reinstatement, since this group
includes those the NLRB could not
reach, those who had died, etc. If about
40 percent of those who received offers
did accept reinstatement, no more tlian
690 returned to their jobs at Kohler be-
tween I960 and 1965.
There were essentially three reasons
"NLRB V. Kohler. 52LC 16, 617 (1965).
"Kohler Company, 148 NLRB 1434 (1964).
"Uphoff, op. cit., p. 305.
given by the Kohler workers for refusing
the reinstatement offer: nearly 20 percent
rejected on the ground that the job they
were currently holding paid a higher
wage; about 14 percent rejected because
there was no union contract at Kohler;
and about 10 percent rejected because
Kohler had put its enamel atid brass
divisions on a short (tliirty-two hour)
workweek. Most of the remaining work-
ers did not give a specific reason for
rejecting the reinstatement offer, al-
though health was apparently another
important factor.^ "
The General Hypothesis
Our central concern here is to identify
those cliaracteristics which were associ-
ated with an employee's acceptance of
the reinstatement offer. A wide range of
personal, social, and economic variables
which might help to discriminate be-
tween those who accepted reinstatement
and those who did not were examined.
It is readily acknowledged that, given the
heavily emotional overtones of the Koh-
ler strike, a worker's decision to accept
reinstatement might be the result of com-
plex psychological forces not readily
subject to measurement or quantification.
Instead, focus was put on measurable
characteristics which, on the basis of ac-
cumulated labor market research, are
associated with a worker's ability to oper-
ate successfully in the labor market.
Specifically, the general hypothesis
under which the investigation was car-
ried out is as follows; Strikers who were
most likely to experience difficulty being
reabsorbed into the labor force were
considered to be the most likely candi-
dates to accept reinstatement. Past stud-
ies of workers displaced because of plant
apparently was a frequent conse-
quence of Kohler emplojinent. Many of the
older strikers visited Rocky Knoll Sanitorium.
REINSTATEMENT AS A PUBLIC POLICY REMEDY 185
sluitdowns and technological change
pointed to characteristics related to a dis-
placed worker's reemployment experi-
ence. We know on the basis of research
conducted by Myers, Shultz, Weber, Fer-
man, Franke, Wilcock, and others, that
older, lower wage, more senior, less edu-
cated, and less skilled workers are likely
to have the most difficult labor market
experience after displacement.^ "* We
make the important assumption that the
labor market experience of workers dis-
charged for union activity approximates
that of workers displaced for more ordi-
nary economic reasons, and accordingly
hypothesize that, among other variables,
age, wage, education, marital status,
number of dependents, seniority, and
skill level were important determinants
oE acceptance of reinstatement by the
Kohler striker.
The assumption that the labor market
experience of illegally discharged work-
ers is similar to that of workers displaced
for economic reasons is probably not
valid if the unfair labor strike is quickly
terminated and the order of reinstate-
ment issued within a relatively short
period of time. In fact, however, the
average time elapsed in processing sec-
tion 8 (a)(5)2i cases from filing to closing
is 1,020 days, or nearly three years, for
those brought through the court order
A. Myers and George P. Shultz. The
Dynamics of a Labor Market (New York: Pren-
tice-Hall. 1951); Richard C. Wilcock and Walter
H. Franke. Unwanted Workers (Glencoe, III.:
The Free Press. I0G3); William Habcr, Louis A.
Fennan. and James R. Hudson. The Impact of
Technological Change (Kalamazoo, Mich.: W. E.
ITpjohn Institute for Employment Research,
1963); George Shultz and Arnold Weber. Strate-
gics for the Displaced Worker (New York: Har-
per and Row. 1966).
"NLRA. "Section 8—It shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer.. .(5) To refuse
to bargain collectively with the representatives of
his employees, subject to the provisions ol section
stage.-2 The longer a strike, the stronger
the forces which compel the striker to
find alternative work. If the employer
Iiires replacements and commits obvious
unfair labor practices, the worker may
realize very quickly that the line between
being on strike and being discharged is
a thin one.
While our evidence on the experience
of the strikers between 1954 and 1960 is
fragmentary, it indicates that about 60
percent of the Kohler strikers had found
new jobs within two years of the com-
mencement of the strike, i.e., by April
1956; and that nearly 90 percent had
found new jobs within four years. (These
figures do not include the several hun-
dred workers who returned to Kohler
in response to the company's "back-to-
work movement.") The labor market re-
absorption rates for Kohler strikers (as
well as for other strikers) are no doubt
much slower than the reabsorption rates
for economically displaced workers, other
things being equal. Nevertheless, if the
scanty information we have on the strik-
ers between 1954 and 1960 is at all
accurate, it indicates that the great ma-
jority of Kohler strikers had at least one
job and were otherwise active in the
labor market fully four yean before the
I960 reinstatement offer. From this it
appears that the labor market experience
of Kohler strikers, especially by 1960,
roughly approximates that of other types
of displaced workers.
Factors Related to Acceptance
of the Reinstatement Offer
Specific factors afEect a worker's de-
cision to accept or reject reinstatement.
This sample deals with 922 Kohler strik-
ers for whom nearly complete informa-
tion was available.
^Information supplied by the NLRB.
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Age and sex. Only a small proportion
(4 percent) of the Kohler labor force
was female. More than 60 percent of the
women accepted reinstatement compared
to about 40 percent of the men. How-
ever, there were too few women in the
sample from which to draw significant
conclusions; therefore, the sex variable
was not included in the analysis.
Table 1 shows that the percentage of
Kohler workers in each age category ac-
cepting reinstatement (the acceptance
rate) increased with age and t!ie per-
centage rejecting decreased. Of the strik-
ers over 40 years of age in 1960, 48 per-
cent accepted rein.statement compared
to 31 percent of those 40 and yotmger;
chi-square tests show that the association
between age and reinstatement is signifi-
cant at better than the .01 level. More-
over, the average age of those accepting
reinstatement is 4L2 years compared to
37.7 for those rejecting the company's
offer. This difference is statistically sig-
nificant at the .01 level.
Table 1. Strikers' Response to Reinstate-
ment versus Age.
Accept Reject
Age in 1960
^0. % No. %
Under 30.. 13 29.5 31 70.5
31-35 32 26.4 89 73.6
36-40 54 34.2 104 65.8
41-45 74 42.5 100 57.5
46-50 78 50.6 76 49.4
51-55 65 49.6 66 50.4
56-60 35 47.9 38 52.1
64-65 27 62.8 16 37.2
66-70 8 42.1 11 57.9
70 and over 3 60.0 2 40.0
Total. . . . 389 42.2 533 57.8
Mean age 41.2 37.7
Note: X« = 35.9; df =« 9; 0 < .01.
Marital status and number of depend-
ent children. Fortunately, the data also
allowed distinction between married men
with and without a working wife.
Table 2 shows the relationship between
marital .status and the strikers' response
to reinstatement. Approximately 21 per-
cent of the strikers' wives were working
in 1960.
Table 2. Strikers' Response to Reinstate-
ment versus Marital Status and Labor
Force Status of Wife.
Accept Reject
Status of Wije
No. % No. %
Single, widowed,
divorced 43 38.4 69 61.6
Married, wife not
working in 1960... 288 46.8 327 53.2
Married, wife work-
ing in 1960 58 29.7 t37 70.3
Total 389 42.2 533 57.8
Note: X» = 18.5; df = 2; p < .01.
Married men whose wives were not
working were much more likely to accept
reinstatement than strikers with working
wives. Single, divorced, and widowed
men (roughly 13 percent of the sample)
fall into a middle ground in terms of
acceptance rate.
The number of dependent children
also exerted an influence on a striker's
decision on reinstatement, as shown in
Table 3. The larger the number of de-
pendent children, the more likely a strik-
er was to accept Kohler's offer in 1960.
The chi-square test is again significant
at less than .01. For example, only about
33 percent of the strikers with no chil-
dren accepted reinstatement as compared
to 70 percent with families of five or
more. Moreover, the mean number of
dependent children of strikers rejecting
reinstatement is 1.5, whereas it is nearly
2.0 for those returning to their old jobs
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Table 3. Strikers' Response to Reinstate-
ment versus Number of Dependent
Children.
Accept Reject
Number oj Dependent
Children No. % No. %
0 79 33.5 157 66.5
1 99 41.8 138 58.2
2 104 43.7 134 56.3
3 53 46.1 62 53.9
4 27 55.1 22 44.9
5 or more 14 70.0 6 30.0
Total 376 42.0 519 58.0
Mean number of
dependent
children 1.9 1.5
Note: X» =- 18.005; df = 5; p < .01.
(difference is significant at less than .01;
t = 3.03).
Table 4 shows the effect of both mari-
tal status (including the labor force status
o[ the wife) and number of dependent
children on the strikers' response to re-
instatement. For example, for strikers
with no dependent children, 37.9 per-
cent of the single, divorced, and widowed
accepted reinstatement; 31.5 percent of
those married without a working wife
accepted reinstatement; and 26.7 percent
of those married with a working wife
accepted reinstatement. The relationship
between marital status and reinstatement
for strikers with zero dependents is not
significant, as judged by the chi-square
test.
There is a strong association, however,
between marital status and reinstatement
for workers with one or two dependent
children. The chi-square test is signifi-
cant at better than the .01 level. Table
4 shows that differences are particularly
significant between men with and men
without working wives and those with
one or two dependent children. Strikers
whose wives were not working were much
more likely to accept reinstatement. Be-
cause of the relatively few strikers with
three or more children, a significance
level of any real value for the association
between reinstatement and marital sta-
tus, distinguishing men with and without
working wives, could not be determined.
It can be noted, therefore, that whether
the strikers were married and had a work-
ing wife seems to have been a major de-
terminant of their response to reinstate-
ment if the household had one or two
children. In households with no depend-
ents, there was a tendency to reject re-
instatement, regardless of marital status
Table 4. Strikers' Response to Reinstatement versus Marital Status and Number of
Dependent Children.
SingUt Divorced, Widowed Married, Wife Not Working Married, Wife Working
in 1960 in 1960
Number of
Dependent Children Accept Reject Accept Reject Accept Reject
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
0 36 37.9 59 62.1 35 31.5 76 68.5 8 26.7 22 73.3
1 3 33.3 6 66.7 81 49.4 83 50.6 15 23.4 49 76.6
2 1 20.0 4 80.0 84 50.3 83 49.7 19 28.8 47 71.2
3 2 100.0 0 0.0 44 45.4 53 54.6 7 43.8 9 56.3
4 1 100.0 0 0.0 24 57.1 18 42.9 2 33.3 4 66.7
5 or more 0 0.0 0 0.0 11 64.7 6 35.3 3 100.0 0 0.0
Total 43 38.4 69 61.6 279 46.7 319 53.3 54 29.2 131 70.8
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or labor force status of the wife. In
households with three or more depend-
ents, there was a tendency to accept re-
instatement regardless of marital status
or labor force status o£ the wife.
Influence of Workers' Education,
Seniority, and Wages
Education, Studies of the lahor market
have shown the influence of education
on the reemployment experience of dis-
placed workers; i.e., less educated work-
ers clearly have a more difficult time find-
ing alternative employment than the
more edticated. It would follow, then,
that the less educated Kohler worker
wotild be the most likely to accept the
reinstatement offer. Table 5 shows the
marked difference in acceptance rates be-
tween high school graduates and those
without a high school diploma.
Table 5. Strikers' Response to Reinstate-
ment Offer versus Education.*
Accept Reject
Tears of Schooling
Xo. % No. %
0-8 205 47.1 230 52.9
9-11 88 45.6 114 56.4
12 92 33.8 180 66.2
13 or more 4 30.8 9 69.2
Total 389 42.2 533 57.8
Mean years of
achoolt 9.3 9.7
*X> = 13.004; df = 3; p < .01.
tt - 2.9.
Nearly half (47 percent) of the Kohler
workers in Table 5 had completed fewer
than nine years of school; only about 1.4
percent had gone beyond high school.
Just under 70 percent of the small num-
ber with more than a high school edu-
cation rejected reinstatement; their alter-
native opportunities made a return to
Kohler unattractive. In general, the mean
level of education was less for those ac-
cepting reinstatement than for those re-
jecting—9.28 years to 9.73 years respec-
tively, and this difference is significant
at less than the .01 level.
Before tlie 1954 strike, almost all
the Kohler strikers (about 90 percent)
!iad been employed in semiskilled work.
It is difficult to differentiate between
them on the basis of skill, except, perhaps
by their level of education.
Seniority. One might expect that work-
ers with long years of service at Kohler
would be more likely to accept rein-
statement tlian short-ser\'ice workers. In
other collective bargaining relationships,
high seniority usually means that the
worker has accumulated certain nonvest-
ed job-related benefits. It may also imply
that a worker is more "loyal" to his
employer and more attached to his job.
At Kohler, however, long service did not
necessarily mean added tangible benefits
for the worker. The Kohler employee
Iiad seniority rights only in his depart-
ment. The company refused to recognize
any limits on interdepartmental trans-
fers, and workers frequently found that
their seniority was dissolved by an intra-
plant job change. Layoffs were not re-
lated to seniority, nor were pensions.
Seniority was taken into consideration on
promotions only when ability of the can-
didates was equal. There was no "posting
and bidding system" on joh advance-
ments; Kohler firmly believed that work-
ers should be rewarded on the basis of
merit alone. Disagreement over seniority
rights was one of the major causes of
the 1954 strike.
Despite the weaknesses in Kohler's
seniority system. Table 6 demonstrates
that workers with longer service were
more likely to accept reinstatement. The
mean seniority for workers accepting re-
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Table 6. Strikers' Response to Reinstate-
ment versus Seniority.*
Tears of Seniority at
Time of Strike
Accept Reject
No.
0-4 98
5-9 75
tO-14 75
15-19 72
20-24 12
25-29 31
30-34 21
35-39 2
40 or more 3
Total 389
Mean years
seniority t 13.5
32.2 206 67.8
36.6 130 63.4
53.6 65 46.4
49.3 74 50.7
63.2 7 36.8
48.4 33 51.6
61.8 13 38.2
33.3 4 66.7
75.0 1 25.0
42.2 533 57.8
10.5
*X» = 37.2; d f = 8 ; p < .01.
tt - 5.0; p < .01.
instatement was 13.5 years, three years
more than those rejecting; and this is
Iiighly significant. The chi-square test on
the association is also significant at better
than the .01 level.
What accounts for the relationship be-
tween seniority and reinstatement? It is
true, of course, that there is no way of
telling how much stronger the relation-
ship might have been if .seniority had
been more meaningful for the strikers.
Also, seniority is highly correlated with
age (the correlation coefficient is 0.71).
And the use of discriminant analysis—
discu.ssed in a subsequent section—re-
veals age to be a stronger predictor of the
striker's reinstatement decision than sen-
iority. It might also be argued that more
senior employees had a tendency to ac-
cept reinstatement not because seniority
meant a great deal to them in 1960, but
Ijecause of their expectation that the es-
tablishment of positive collective bargain-
ing at Kohler would lead to the enhance-
ment of the seniority system.
Wages. Wage data available on the
Kohler employees is limited principally
to hourly rates paid to the workers in
1954 prior to the strike.^ '"*
The median hourly wage of the Kohler
worker before the 1954 strike was approx-
imately g;i.8O. Sixty percent of the Kohler
strikers had been making between $L50
and 32.00 an hour. The hourly wage
offer made to workers accepting reinstate-
ment in 1960 was not much higher than
the liourly wages paid in 1954; however,
Kohler did increase wages by about 16
percent between April 5, 1954 and No-
vember 24, 1958. Of more importance,
though, and as noted earlier, Kohler cut
the workweek to thirty-two hours prin-
cipally to insure that as many as possible
of those workers hired after 1954 could
continue in employment. As a result,
returning strikers had weekly earnings
which were not much more than 80 per-
cent of their 1954 level.
It is clear from Table 7 that there was
a strong relationsliip between the strik-
Table 7. Strikers' Response to Reinstate-
ment versus 1954 Hourly Wage Rate.
Wage Rate
Accept Reject
No. % No. %
S 0-1.49 tO9 83.2 22 16.8
1-50-1.99 201 52.6 181 47.4
2.00-2.49 25 25.3 74 74.7
2.50 and up 1 8.3 11 91.7
Total 336 53.8 288 46.2
Mean wage 1.59 1.82
Note: X* = 88.2; df = 3; p < .01.
er's hourly wage rate in 1954 and his
decision to accept reinstatement. For
useablc sample in iliis section is reduced
to 624. In this smaller sample, 53.8 percent ac-
cepted reinstatement. Comparing the smaller
sample of acceptances with the larger sample
used in preceding sections, however, reveals no
significant differences between the two groups
in terms of the means and variances of the vari-
ables analyzed in this article. The same is inie
of the larger and smaller samples of rejections.
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example, over 83 percent of the workers
in the low-wage category accepted rein-
statement, whereas only 23.4 percent of
those workers who had earned S2.00 an
hour or more in 1954 returned to Kohler
in 1960. Moreover, the mean 1954 wage
of those accepting reinstatement was $.23
an hour less than those rejecting the com-
pany's offer.
It is interesting to see how education
affects the relation between wage level
and reinstatement. Table 8 indicates that
the chi-square test on the wage-reinstate-
ment relation is highly significant within
each of the three education categories.
The same strong inverse relation between
wage and percentage accepting reinstate-
ment is still present, even when dis-
aggregated by educational attainment.
On the other hand, much of the signifi-
cance of the education-reinstatement
relation is eliminated by holding the
wage rate constant; it disappears com-
pletely for those who had earned under
$1.50 an hour.
It might be thought that the Kohler
workers* wage rates are related not only
to education but also to seniority and
age. Regressing wages on these variables,
however, reveals no significant relation:
i = 1.87196 -
- .00146X4
(.00181)
.00303X2
(.00181)
.00375X3
(.00630)
R2 = .0163 F = 3.420
The regression equation shows that
less than 2 percent of the observed vari-
ation in the Kohler employees' 1954 wage
rates (Xj) can be explained by age (Xo),
education (X3), and seniority (X^). None
of the regression coefficients is significant.
Note that even the signs in the equation
nm counter to a priori expectations.
Adding the variables of number of de-
pendent children and marital status doe.s
nothing to improve the fit. Wage rates,
therefore, appear to be virtually inde-
pendent of the other variables examined
in this analysis.
It may be that a better fit would be ob-
tained if it were possible to use some
better measure of earnings, rather than
the simple hourly wage rate. The appar-
ent independence of the Kohier wage
structure may reflect the company's ideo-
Table 8. Strikers' Response to Reinstatement by Wage Rate and Years of Schoolins;.
f
Wage Ratf
11
S 0-1.49 . .
1 50 1 99
2 00-2.49 . . .
Total
•X» = 40.5;
tX» = 15.4;
tX» - 33.5;
P •
P *
P *
(hS
Accept
No.
. 57
105
1
, 178
i .01.
i .01.
C .01.
%
85.1
59.3
29.4
20.0
59.3
*
Reject
No.
10
77.
36
4
122
%
14.9
40.7
70.6
80.0
40.7
Tears oj Schooting
9-1
Accept
No.
26
46
5
77
%
78.8
54.1
27.8
-
55.8
n
Reject
No.
1
39
13
2
61
%
21.2
45.9
72.2
100.0
44.2
m
Accept
No.
26
46
5
-
77
%
83.9
41.1
16.7
-
43.3
Reject
No.
5
66
25
5
101
%
16.1
58.9
83.3
100.0
56.7
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logical commitment to individual initia-
tive and the use of incentive payments.
Discriminant Analysis
Discriminant analysis was applied to
the data in order to determine which
linear combination of the variables ex-
amined best discriminates between those
accepting and those rejecting reinstate-
ment. Discriminant analysis is similar to
regression analysis, except that regression
analysis is most applicable to cases in
whicli the dependent variable is continu-
ous, whereas discriminant analysis is
most applicable to cases in which the
dependent variable is dichotomous (as
here) or polychotomous. The technique
is especially appropriate when one is not
trying to detennine whether or not two
samples are from different populations,
but rather when one is attempting to
estimate how closely the characteristics
of one subject resemble the characteris-
tics of the group to whicli he belongs (or
is likely to belong). The discriminant
technique produces an equation, or func-
tion, wliich generates a "discriminant
score," or index, for each subject.^ ^ The
higher or lower the score, the greater the
HkeHIiood that tl^ e .subject belongs to one
group as opposed to the other. If the
function is capable of perfect discrimina-
tion, then the score it generates for each
individual will place him within the
group to which he, in fact, belongs.^ o
Table 9 presents the results of the dis-
criminant analysis. It was necessary to
use two randomly selected samples of
strikers—270 who had accepted reinstate-
ment and 270 who had rejected—becau.se
of the limits on the sample .size contained
"C. R. Rao. Linear Statistical Inference and
Its Applications (New York: John Wiley, 1965),
pp. 480-483, 487-J9S.
"^ See Gerhard Tinlner, Econometrics (New
York: John Wiley & Sons Science Ediiions. 1965),
pp. 96-102.
in the canned computer program used in
the analysis. The means are computed
within each group for each variable. D^
is a measure of the weighted difference of
the means, where the weights are the co-
efficients of the variables in the discrimi-
nant function. An F-value is computed
using the values of D2, and the signifi-
cance of the equations can be tested in
the usual way. All of the twenty-two
equations in Table 9 are significant at
the 5 percent level or better. The equa-
tions are ordered on the basis of the
number of strikers correctly predicted by
the equations to be within either the
acceptance group or the rejection group.
In the absence of any knowledge of the
strikers, chance alone should permit us
to predict the reinstatement decision for
50 percent of the strikers. Knowing the
hourly wage rate allows prediction of the
striker's decision in about 71 percent of
the cases (equation 1). This is signifi-
cantly better than chance. The addition
of other variables to the discriminant
equation, however, reduces the predictive
power of the equations. For example,
equation 2, in which age is combined
with wage, predicts 70 percent of the
strikers' decisions correctly—still sig-
nificantly better than chance, but less
powerful than wage alonel The most
powerful discriminant equations, in the
sense of predictive power, all contain the
wage variable. The most powerful equa-
tion in the absence of the wage variable
(equation 13) combines the other five
variables and predicts 64 percent of the
strikers' deci.sions correctly—7 percent
less than the wage variable by itself, but
still much better than chance.
When wage is excluded from the equa-
tions, age is the next strongest determi-
nant of a striker's reinstatement decision.
When both wage and age are excluded,
seniority is the third strongest variable;
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Table 9. Discriminant Analysis.
CoefficietOs
Equation
(?)
Age
(2)
Marital
Stains
U)
Number
Dependent
Children
{4)
Edtuation
(5)
Seniority
(6)
Wage, 1954'
-.00060
-.00059
-.00060
-.00059
-.00061
-.00060
-.00060
-.00060
-.00059
-.00060
-.00060
-.00062
.75310
.92249
.98724
.85953
.93796
.98931
.93907
.77745
.85526
.98842
.99157
.85990
.27028
.23422
.26760
.23250
.26038
.13183
.21163
.20190
.20327
.20767
F
101.66811
62.15208
26.45719
38.53506
31.47977
26.51286
25.16642
52.38036
57.62268
33.17330
22.10294
38.55146
7.24333
10.50076
8.98118
15.66428
11.67361
17.79730
14.25847
27.25637
13.69528
13.99162
Predicted
Correctly
70.74
70.00
70.00
69.63
69.63
69.63
69.63
69.26
69.26
69.26
69.26
67.41
64.07
62.96
61.85
61,48
61.48
61.11
61.11
60.37
58.89
58.89
2.\... .00008
3 00008 -.00009 .00033 .00003
4 -.00006 .00006
5"'"_' .00034 -.00004 .00006
h...\. .00007 .00031 .00003 .00002
7 -.00006 .00036 -.00004 .00006
g _ --.00014
i)\\\\ .00007
10 . .00006 .00031 .00002
11 00007 -.00009 .00033 .00003 .00002
12 .00035 -.00012
13 00008 -.00032 .00030 .00005 .00002
14 00009 .00022 .00004
15 00007 -.00031 .00029 .00002
16 00008 .00022
17 00009 -.00031 .00029
18 .00008
19 00009 -.00017
20 00009
21 00009 .00004
22 00007 00002
by itself, it predicts 61 percent of the
strikers' decisions correctly (equation 18).
Because of the intercorrelation of age
and seniority, however, when age is in-
cluded in the equation, seniority loses
much of its force.
The discriminant equation which in-
cludes the wage variable alone is the most
powerful predictor, but this fact should
not be interpreted to mean that the other
variables are unimportant. First, as noted
above, all the equations in Table 9 are
significant, in the sense that they could
not have arisen by chance alone. Second,
the use of chi-square and means tests in
earlier sections showed that each of the
six variables is related to the striker's re-
in,statement decision.
Summary
The authors' general hypothesis—that
the most disadvantaged worker in the
labor market would be the most likely to
accept Kohler's offer of reinstatement—is
borne out by the evidence. Lower wage,
older, less educated, less skilled workers
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with greater family obligations were the
most likely workers to accept Kohler's
court-ordered ofFer.^ fl It is known from
the accumulated research on the opera-
tion of the labor market that these are
the traits of workers who have the most
difficult time finding reemployment after
displacement. The market does not seem
to afford them the protection it provides
other workers. But in a sense, reinstate-
ment does; it restores the disadvantaged
to their jobs. Admittedly, they had a long
wait, but eventually work became a re-
ality. In this sense, the remedy was effec-
tive even though only 40 percent of all
strikers offered jobs accepted. In other
words, measuring the effectiveness of the
reinstatement remedy in terms of the
simple proportion who were restored to
tlieir jobs indicates that a minority elect-
ed to take advantge of the reinstatement
offer; undoubtedly, this was not the in-
tended result of the remedy's use. On the
other hand, by examining the character-
istics of those who returned, we have
shown that the remedy did afford some
protection for those strikers who were
likely to be most adversely affected by
an unfair labor practice strike.
Although the evidence tends to show
that workers displaced for economic
reasons and workers discharged after an
unfair labor practice strike have similar
experiences in the labor market, there
are important differences between the
two types of displaced workers, which in-
clude the following.
(1) The economically displaced worker
knows immediately that he is perma-
nently terminated and must reenter the
labor market to find alternative employ-
ment. The worker caught in an unfair
"An interesting iniplication ot this is that
employers in long unfair labor practice strikes
incur the cost of losing their best men—the ones
who do not return.
labor practice strike may expect a quick
end to the strike or ultimate reinstate-
ment, and this expectation may keep him
from making a serious search for anotlier
job until he is finally convinced or com-
pelled to do so by the circumstances o£
his displacement.
(2) The economically displaced worker
often may expect remedial assistance
from his employer in the form of trans-
fer opportunities, retraining, severance
pay, placement services, and the like
upon his termination. Of course, this
help would not he available to the
worker replaced during an imfair labor
practice strike.
(3) Public policy has been devised to
aid the economically displaced worker.
Aid includes unemployment cotnpensa-
tion, retraining, and other manpower
programs. Most of these programs are
closed to strikers on the assumption that
their lack of work is largely their own
fault.2" This assumption may be diffi-
cult to justify in the case of a worker
caught in an unfair labor practice strike.
These workers have an extended period
of joblessness aggravated by their em-
ployer's unlawful actions.
Moreover, Kohler did not bargain with
the union until June 1962, nearly two
years after the Board had found the com-
pany guilty of bargaining in bad faith.
As a result, the wages, hours, and work-
ing conditions which existed in 1954 pre-
vailed until June 1962, when the UAW
finally won a substantially improved one-
year contract. Since then, the UAW has
negotiated six one-year contracts %vith
=^ An exception would be the tmeinployment
cornpen.sation laws in New York and Rhode Is-
land which pennit strikers to colleet unem-
plovinent after seven weeks on strike. See U. S.
Department of Labor, Manpower Administration,
Bureau of Employment Security, Comparison of
State Unemployment Insurance Laws (Washine-
ton, G.P.O.: 1958). BES No. U-141, p. E-18
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Kohler; and according to Raymond Ma-
jerus, Kohler workers' wages are now on
a par with the wages of other employees
in the organized sector of the plumbing-
ware industry.-^
These differences raise a general ques-
tion: Wliat is the remedial intent of re-
instatement with or without back pay?
Is it designed to (1) restore the status quo
ante, (2) promote positive collective bar-
gaining, (3) minimize industrial unrest,
or (4) some combination of these? Board
member Gerald Brown recently asked,
"How is it possible to restore the situa-
tion to where it would have been if tlie
good-faith bargaining required under the
law had occurred I or 2 or 3 or more
years before?"^ ® This seems to mean
two things. First, how can legal or Board
processes be accelerated to reduce the
time between the issuance of a complaint
and a Board order? And second, how can
we make "the position(s) of the wronged
parties the same as before the commission
of a wrong."^"
Recommendations
It is always possible to speed up any
bureaucratic process if one has sufficient
funds. But the Board does not have un-
limited funds to spend to become more
efficient. The Board could streamline its
administrative machinery to decrease
case loads, but this would not decrease to
any extent the time between a complaint
and an order.
What about restoring the status quo?
"Telephone conversation with Raymond Ma-
jeriis. lntt-rnational Representative of the UAW
ill Milwaukee. Jan. 17. 1968.
"Speech ^vvn on Nov. 2. 1967 in Dallas,
Texas, at the Fourteenth Annual Institute on
Labor Law of the Southwestern Legal Foun-
dation.
""Harry A. Millis and Emily C. Brown. From
the Taft Hartley Act to the Wagner Act (Chi-
cago. 111.: The University of Chicago Press. 1950).
p. 482.
Is this even possible? Taken literally, one
might be restoring the conditions just
prior to an 8(a)(5) strike which in fact
caused the strike, instead of restoring
conditions which would lead to good-
faith bargaining. How can one restore
what never existedl It seems more fruit-
ful to take another tack; that is, instead
of restoring the status quo ante, why not
attempt to promote positive collective
bargaining? This approach might mini-
mize industrial unrest as an outgrowth
of bad-faith bargaining.
An obvious solution would be to devise
a remedy which encourages good-faith
collective bargaining. One way to do this
would be to increase the cost of bad-faith
bargaining. The back-pay portion of the
reinstatement remedy aims to compen-
sate the unfair labor practice strikers (or
8{a)(3) dischargees). In this sense the rem-
edy is nonpunitive, not a private award
for personal damages, but a sum given
in the public interest in vindication of
public rights.3i But if employers guilty
of bad-faith bargaining must pay work-
ers who protest such behavior, then
awarding back pay is costly to them.
From the employer's standpoint then,
back pay is punitive, i.e., he pays for
committing a wrong.^ ^
The rational employer who must pay
for his wrongs is likely to consider the
costs of bad-faith bargaining. If the costs
are greater than zero, they would logi-
cally tend to inhibit his propensity to
engage in unfair labor practices. In-
creased costs, therefore, could lead to less
bad-faith bargaining. If costs were in-
creased infinitely, unfair labor practices
would cease entirely, since any rational
employer would prefer to stay in busi-
ness than to commit an unfair labor
•^Smith d.b.a. Clayton Willard Sales. 1960.
e c u NLRB P 18707.
•"Millis and Brown, op. cit., p. 48S.
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practice and then be forced to cease oper-
ating. But this kind of remedy is un-
thinkable, since it certainly would not
encourage "the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining."^^ Tliere may be
some cost greater than zero and less than
infinity, however, which would stimulate
positive collective bargaining practices
and minimize employer (and union) un-
fair labor practices.^ '*
Tliat the costs imposed on Kohler in
the form of back pay were not sufficient
to achieve desirable goals should be self-
evident. Indeed, there is good reason to
believe that the remedies employed by
the Board in 8(a)(5) cases have not suc-
ceeded in discouraging employers from
engaging in bad-faith bargaining. Section
8(a)(5) bargaining cases have increased
significantly in recent years—from 1,311
cases in 1959 to 3,811 in 1966.35
One way of increasing the costs of bad-
faith bargaining is to require an employ-
er to add to back pay the amount the
employees might have gotten if the em-
ployer had bargained in good faith.^s
For example, the Board might require
that an employer found guilty of bad-
faith bargaining would have ninety days
to come to terms with the union; if at
the end of thi.s period he does not comply
"National Labor Relations Act, sec. (1),
"A strong case can be made that behavior
which is initially forced on unwilling parties
eventually becomes accepted. See Milton Rok-
each. The Open and Closed Mind (New Yorit:
Basic Books, 1960).
""NLRB. Annual Report, for fiscal years 1959
through 1966. Tables 1 and 2.
••.See Ex-Cell-O Corp. v. UAW, 25-CA-2377.
Recently, attorneys for the UAW argued similar-
ly that the Board should order employers guilty
of bad-faiih bargaining to "compensate each of
its employees for the tnonetary value during the
i>eriod of the unlawful refusal to bargain of
such additional wage and related benefits as it is
reasonable to conclude the union could have
obtained through bargaining."
witli the Board's order, the additional
penalty could be imposed.
The penalty would have two basic
parts: first, reimbursement of the net
back pay accumulated by employees from
the date of their rejected application for
reinstatement; and second, reimburse-
ment of the amount the employees might
liave received had the employer origin-
ally bargained in good faith. The esti-
mated wage increase could be applied
from the date of the unfair labor practice
charge.
How would this latter amount be de-
termined?^' If this penalty were to be
applied, the Board would have to identi-
fy a set of firms similar to the one in
question which were organized by simi-
lar unions at the time the union made
the bad-faith charge. The Board would
compare wage increases in this group
with wage increases in another group of
similar unorganized firms over the same
time period. The mean wage and fringe
differences, if any, would be an addition-
al penalty. The practicality of this ap-
proach leaves a good deal to be desired.
Moreover, it would create an administra-
tive nightmare. Even if one had some
general estimate of the impact of unions
on wages, it seems unreasonable to give
UAWs brief in the Ex-Cell-O case
ts up the difficulty of estimating the eco-
nomic impact of unionism. There is a calculation
of the average wage and fringe difference before
and after a union contract for sixty-six UAW
unions certified bv the Board between April and
September 1966. These values may be inadequate
estimates of the penalties to be applied to em-
ployers hargaining in bad faith for at lea.st two
reasons. First, there is no classification of firms
by size, geographic location, industry, profits,
technology, and market structure, viz some cor-
relates of bargaining power. As such the wage
increase ranges from 7^/hr. to 45r/hr. Second,
there is no control, so there is no way of knowing
what the wage increases were like for a similar
sample of finns which were not oi^janized by
UAW unions between April and September 1966.
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to a particular union all the gains that
other unions obtained over many years
of bargaining.
It seems more practical to offer a some-
what different recommendation. Rather
than add to hack pay the amount the
employees might have received if the
employer had bargained in good faith,
it would be simpler to fine the employer
from the date of the unfair labor practice
charge. The amount of the fine could he
the average wage gain obtained by unions
in a relevant industry during negotia-
tions which took place around the time
of the unfair labor practice charge. How-
ever, this fine would not be an estimate
of the amount employees might have re-
ceived if the employer had bargained in
good faith. It simply would he a fine.
This may be a dubious distinction, but
it may soften criticism of the recommen-
dation as well as make it academically
palatable.
Moreover, it is also recommended that
the Board, in setting the fine, be free
to consider other relevant factors. For
example, the Board could adjust upward
or downward the level of the penalty
according to whether the employer was
a first-time offender or a flagrant violator
of the law. In addition, the Board might
consider changes in the cost of living,
adjttsting the amount of the fine to re-
flect changes in the Consumer Price In-
dex.
Modifications to the Reinstatement
and Back-Pay Remedy
Two additional modifications in the re-
instatement and back-pay remedy are
also recommended.
(1) The Board should modify the re-
quirement that strikers make an uncon-
ditional application for reinstatement.
Strikers should be permitted to add to
their application the "condition" that
the employer obey the Board's order to
bargain in good faith. If this rule had
been applied in the Kohler case, it would
have resulted in about one and one-quar-
ter years of additional back pay for about
150 workers who refused Kohler's offer in
I960 because the company was not bar-
gaining in good faith.
(2) The Board should require that the
employer make explicit and concrete
offers of reinstatement. Many strikers re-
turned to Kohler in 1960 without know-
ing that the company had cut the work-
week to thirty-two hours. The Board
should require that the company's offer
contain the exact job, shift, hours, rate
of pay, and other relevant conditions of
employment.
This proposed remedy could have un-
intended results. That is, increasing the
costs of bad-faith bargaining may not
neces.sarily stimulate good-faith bargain-
ing. What may occur is more sophisticat-
ed bad-faith bargaining (which could be
extremely difficult to prove). The appli-
cation of our remedy also may lead to
increased involvement by the Board in
the collective bargaining process and
therefore to increased legalism in section
8(a)(5) cases.
Is there another way to promote posi-
tive collective bargaining? Suppose there
were no Board, no third party to turn to
in these kinds of bargaining disputes.
Would tlie UAW, under these circum-
stances, have mounted a more effective
strike? Could it have forced Kohler to
bargain in good faith before 1962?
Would the resolution of this conflict by
raw power have satisfied congressional
intent as reflected in the NLRA? If the
answers to these questions are yes, would
the elimination of section 8(a)(5) be a
better way to promote and encourage
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positive collective bargaining than by
"tinkering with the existing remedy"?^^
Eliminating section 8(a)(5) is a drastic
step and one which is hard to recommend
in the absence of conclusive findings
about the consequences of such a move.
Section IO(c) of the Act gives the Board
broad remedial powers and "charges the
Board with the task of devising remedies
to effectuate the policies of the Act."39
Philip Ross lias said.
The major shortcoming of the NLRB lies
in its faikirc to adopt ade(]uate and realistic
remedies in those cases where the employer
lias unmistakably demonstrated a continu-
ing intent to frustrate the Act.'"
Moreover, "The detection of unfair
practices means little if the only sanction
is social embarrassment. The NLRB's
challenge. . .is the formation of specific,
yet flexible orders that give coordinated
effect to the Act."*i Our recommenda-
tion is certainly in accord with current
legal thinking.
"The idea of eliminating section 8(a)(5) wa.s
enunciated by an Independent Sttidy Group in
The Public Interest in National Labor Policy
(New ^ork: Committee for Economic Develop-
incnt. 1961). pp. 82-83. Profes.sor Douglass V.
Brown in a recent talk at tbe State University
of New York at Buffalo (April 2.5. 1!)68) sug-
gcst(<l some persuasive arguments for the elimi-
nation of section 8(a)(5). Moreover, the fear of
excessive •'le(j;alisin" wa-s expres.scd most succinct-
ly by John Duiilop in his I960 presidential ad-
dress before the Industrial Relations Research
Association. "Consensus and National Labor Pol-
icy." Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual
Meeting of the Industrial Relations Research
Association, i960, pp. 2-15.
**Steelworkers v. NLRB and H. K. Porter
Company, Inc.. v. NLRB. District of Colutnbia
Court of Appeals. See Daily Labor Report (Wash-
ington: BNA. Dec. 14. 1967). No. 242. full text
section. Also, see NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co.
344 IJ. S. 344 (1953).
'"Philip Ross. The Labor Law in Action
(Washington: NLRB, 1966). pp. 1-33.
"Dennis M. Flannery. "The Need for Creative
Orders l!ndfr Section 10(c) of the National La-
bor Relations Act." Pennsylvania Law Review,
Vol. 112, 1963, p . 94.
Conclusion
The authors believe their recommen-
dation is reasonable for at least two
reasons. First, the empirical evidence
presented in this article shows that those
most likely to benefit from the reinstate-
ment-hack-pay remedy are the more dis-
advantaged members of tlie work force.
Their recommendation more nearly
achieves the goal of truly making the
workers "whole" for wrongs committed
by their employer. Second, it is supported
by collective bargaining theory.
It may be argued that this recommen-
dation alters the power balance between
the parties. And it does! The Board, how-
ever, has been doing this for years. Back
pay is a cost to the employer and alter-
ing costs alters the balance of power be-
tween the negotiating parties. Consider
the following argument. Neil Chamber-
lain defines the bargaining power of A
as the cost to B of disagreeing on A's
terms relative to the costs of B of agree-
ing on A's terms.^ ^ Following Pao Lun
Cheng in the case under discussion, let
w, represent Kohler's bargaining offer
package, Wj represent the UAW's bar-
gaining demand package, and v repre-
sent the strike.*3 Each package and the
strike have some utility to each side and
can be represented in terms of utility. If
Kohler refused the union's demand, its
cost in terms of utility is u^ (wj) - u^  (v);
and if it agTees, its cost is u^ (w,) - u,,
"Neil W. Chamberlain, Collective Bargaining
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951). pp. 220-221.
"The notation and following argument is
based on Pao Lun Cheng's article, "Wage Ne-
gotiation and Bargaining Power," Industrial and
Labor Relations Review, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Janu-
ary 1968), pp. 163-182. This is an especially good
article on bargaining theory.
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By Chamberlain's definition, then, the
bargaining power of the union would be
_ uu(wO - Uk(v)
^ ' " Uk(Wi) - Uk(Wi)
Similarly, if the UAW rejects Kohler's
offer, the cost is Ua(w,) - u,(v); if it ac-
cepts, the cost is Ua(Wj) - Ua(w,).
Therefore, Kohler's bargaining power
is given by
It is worthwhile considering the im-
plications of tliis formulation of relative
bargaining power, since, as Cheng has
demonstrated, there is "substantial simi-
larity in the explicit or implicit defini-
tions of bargaining power among Cham-
berlain, Pen, and Harsanyi-Zeuthen.
" 4 4
If Kbp is greater than Ubp by virtue of
the commission of certain unfair labor
practices, then a public policy remedy
should either (1) decrease Kohler's bar-
gaining power and consequently increase
the union's, or (2) increase the union's
bargaining power, thereby decreasing
Kohler's. How can this be done? It is not
likely that the Board could alter Wi or Wj.
If it could, it is unlikely that such man-
ipulation would be appropriate for the
Board. The only arbitrarily manipulable
term in the inequality is the cost of a
strike. If the back pay for which the em-
ployer is liable is increased, tlie cost of a
strike to the employer is increased and its
associated utility, Uk(v). decreases, thus
increasing U,,,,. By the same logic, the
utility of a strike for tbe union, Ua(v), in-
creases, and K,,,, falls.
It also seems reasonable to argue that
the duration of an unfair labor practice
strike is a function of the relative power
of each side. If Kbp < Ui,p, the duration
of an employer unfair labor practice
strike would be short. But in this case,
the power differential, Kbp > Ubp. was
quite large. The authors' recommenda-
tion would lessen it and hopefully reduce
the propensity for an employer with
large advantages over the union to en-
gage in bad-faith bargaining.
It might also be noted that such a
penalty is likely to be imposed only in
first bargaining cases. Philip Ross found
that most of the 8(a)(5) charges occurred
in negotiations over the first contract
when the employer was still fighting the
entire idea of bargaining.^^ After one
contract, the frequency of bad-faith bar-
gaining decreases drastically and section
8(a)(5) may become irrelevant. After the
first contract, therefore, it may be sensible
to let pure power decide these issues.^ "
Section 8(a)(5) is less applicable to bar-
gaining situations with some experience,
but when it is applicable, the bad-faith
bargaining may be very subtle and hard
to discern.
Clearly, more severe costs could be
imposed, but why jump to a harsh pen-
alty? It i.s more sensible to escalate the
remedy gradually while testing the im-
pact oE each escalation. This testing is
very necessary since there is no point in
constructing remedies if they do not work
or if they work in an unexpected fashion.
The only guideline is that "the order
[should not be] a patent attempt to
achieve ends other than those which can
[airly be said to effectuate the policies of
the Act."" It is believed this recommen-
dation is within this prescript.
**Ibid., p. 167.
•'Ross. op. cit., pp. 1-33.
"See Bernard Samoff. "Arbitration. Not NLRB
Intervention." Labor Law Journal, Vol. 18, No.
10 (October 1067), pp. 602-631.
"Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Labor
Board. 319 U.S. 533. 540 (1941). Fibreboard Pajwr
Products Corp. v. NLRB. 379 U.S. 205. 216 (1964).

